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Abstract
Building on recent work in the sociology of intellectual interventions, the study of cultural
boundaries of science, and the role of ideas in politics, the article develops a theory of
public epistemologies as argumentative tools people use to support or oppose political
positions. Two prominent public epistemologies that have recently crystallized in Italian
politics are taken as illustrations, with special attention paid to the role of two academics
(an economist and an immunologist) turned public intellectuals. The article argues that
the rise of populism in Italy has contributed to unusual alignments between political and
epistemological positions, which has made questions about science and expert knowledge
much more relevant in contesting and supporting political decisions.
Keywords Science . Intellectuals . Experts . Italy . Vaccines . Anti-euro . Social media
Introduction
Science and expertise have become central political categories in contemporary democratic
societies. Debates about fake news, post-truth, politicisation of research, technocracy, populist
anti-intellectualism, and attacks on universities are a recurring feature of our political predic-
ament. Instead of interpreting this either as the result of technocratic infiltration into all facets
of social and political life, or as the consequences of an irrational assault on science, we should
recognise that both processes are simultaneously taking place in Western democracies: an
“unprecedented reliance on science and expertise” is coupled with “increase suspicion,
scepticism, and dismissal of scientific findings, expert opinion, or even of whole branches
of investigation” (Eyal 2019, p. 4; see also Weingart 1999, Bijker et al. 2009). In these
circumstances, having the power to define what science is, what it ought to be, what it urges
us to do, how we can protect it, and what its many opposites are is more crucial than ever to
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This article deals with a kind of folk theorising of science that takes place in political debates.
This is not limited to controversies in which the natural and medical sciences are mobilised.
“Talks of science” are abound in any dispute involving sufficiently complex subjects, including
economic, social, and cultural issues, as witnesses by the ubiquity of claims to expertise in debates
about immigration law, economic policy, and crime control. By focusing on recent Italian politics,
I argue that political debates involving complex and technical issues reveal competing public
epistemologies that have a certain degree of internal consistency. Public epistemologies are
recurring, complex, and relatively coherent but potentially unstable cultural schemes that define
how one is to distinguish truth from falsity, what is the nature of science, what kind of people or
institution can be trusted to provide reliable knowledge, and which describe in a sequential or
plot-like form why ignorance and error exist in the world and what is to be done of them. Public
epistemologies are systematised by intellectuals and scientists, who are increasingly engaged in
highly publicised controversies. They are anchored in specific political communities and are used
strategically to secure victory in deliberations over concrete policy decisions.
Where do these public epistemologies come from? How do intellectuals and experts develop,
use, and disseminate them? How are they related to party platforms and political ideologies? The
paper offers an answer to these question in the following way. In the first section, I review several
strands of literature and introduce the concept of public epistemology to capture the relatively
coherent and stable theories that actors, and particularly intellectuals, produce when talking about
science. In defining this concept, I untangle my theoretical assumptions to clarify the specificities
of my approach in relation to similar endeavours, such as the literature on civic epistemologies. In
the second section, I present my empirical illustration, first by describing the importance of
appeals to science in the Italian political context at the beginning of the twenty-first century, then
by focusing on the public epistemologies elaborated by two researchers who have achieved the
status of public intellectuals: an immunologist strongly engaged against anti-vaccination groups
and an economist strongly engaged in favour of Italy’s withdrawal from the eurozone. In the
concluding section, I extrapolate the main features of the public epistemologies found in my
empirical cases, and I advance some suggestions about their connection with broader social and
political transformations.
Public Epistemologies
To think about public epistemologies, I draw on four main literatures: research on ideas in
politics, and in particular on the role of “public philosophies” in shaping political debates
(Schmidt 2008), research in science and technology studies on civic epistemologies (Jasanoff
2005), research on boundary work and the cultural boundaries of science (Gieryn 1999), and
research on intellectual interventions and intellectual positioning (Baert 2012).
Since the 1980s, political scientists and sociologists have increasingly focused their atten-
tion on the role of (mostly economic and sociological) ideas in shaping policy-making
outcomes (Campbell 2002). Ideas are generally seen by scholars as not simply reflecting the
interests of voters and policy-makers but instead as relatively autonomous and as especially
relevant in situations of crisis, when exogenous shocks and uncertainty disrupt established
routines and force key actors to draw selectively from the available stock of cognitive tools.
Scholars in this tradition ask why some ideas are more politically successful than others, and
they differentiate ideas on the basis of their level of generality, from the more general level of
public philosophies and world views, to the more particular level of frames and policy
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instruments. Public epistemologies obviously resonate with the concept of public philosophies,
defined by Campbell as “broad opinions, values, and taken-for-granted cultural schema that
permeate society” (1997, p. 39). But as has recently been observed, we should be careful not to
underestimate public philosophies’ constantly negotiated and contested character. For exam-
ple, drawing on the sociology of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006) and analysing three
repertoires of evaluation that have shaped French labour market policy, Carstensen and Hansen
argue that such ideas “typically exhibit significant heterogeneity” and that actors actively
evaluate and create compromise between them (2019, p. 598).
This is a useful insight in the study of public epistemologies. It is problematic to assign
beliefs to whole groups, institutions, or societies, especially when these are traversed by deep
cleavages or function according to adversarial principles. A similar argument can be advanced
against certain works in the “civic epistemology” tradition (Jasanoff 2005, Miller 2008),
according to which civic epistemologies include “the styles of reasoning, modes of argumen-
tation, standards of evidence, and norms of expertise that characterize public deliberation and
political institutions” (Miller 2008, p. 1896). These works tend to generalise to the national
level by comparing regulatory agencies and state institutions operating in different countries.
Scholars working in this tradition admit that a civic epistemology is far from being “a seamless
way of knowing shared by all participants in a political community” (Jasanoff 2005, p. 231),
and acknowledge that pluralist democracies “are almost inevitably characterized by a diversity
of knowledge systems operating within broader civic epistemologies” (Miller 2008, p. 1899).
Yet in the end their approach allows them to say, for instance, that the USA has one (“its own”)
civic epistemology (Miller 2008, p. 1906). This approach also leads them to adopt a normative
register, grounded in a rejection of deficit models of public understanding of science and in the
willingness to engage the public in assessing the standards used by knowledge producing
institutions. Civic epistemologies thus become a set of cognitive and institutional tools that can
be more or less adequate to fulfil human needs for safety and wellbeing. For example, Jasanoff
writes that a “nation’s civic epistemology [is] its capacity for generating reliable collective
knowledge” (2005, p. 221), while Miller states that the study of civic epistemologies should
reveal “how societies ensure that the public construction of epistemic authority itself conforms
to accepted norms of democratic governance” (2008, p. 1905). Although these are very
honourable aims, I find that such normative commitments can interfere with the goal of
understanding how people think about, act on the basis of, and try to impose certain
epistemological ideas in public disputes.1
Instead, the approach I want to defend sees public epistemologies as strategically construed
and deployed in adversarial setting to influence other people and steer them toward certain
decisions. As such, it owes much to the study of cultural boundaries of science as conceived in
the work of Gieryn (1999), with its understanding of scientific boundary work as a credibility
contest, in which players with different goals and interest compete in specific arenas “where
1 My approach is symmetrical and inclusive regarding what should count as epistemology. This is far from being
an obvious choice. Reading my descriptions of public epistemologies below, some readers might think not only
that they are fundamentally flawed, but that they should not be considered as epistemology at all. Similarly, in
debates about secularism and the existence of God, critics of religion often insist that biblical faith “is not an
epistemology”, since it is not “a way of knowing”, but “a way of trusting” (Barnett 2018). What counts as an
epistemology is a contested convention, and often this is because attributing the status of epistemology to
someone’s ideas would be seen by their opponents as conferring them an undeserved privilege. The approach I
advocate is instead inclusive: if something possesses some family resemblances with the things that are generally
associated with the concept of episteme, then we should include rather than exclude it from our studies.
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practical decisions are negotiated and settled” (Gieryn 1999, p. 24). Scholars working in this
constructivist tradition do not ask questions about the true nature or essence of science or
whether a certain person, event, or object, should be considered scientific, but instead consider
science as a cultural category whose meaning is, at least in certain circumstances, discursively
constructed, negotiated, and contested. Although not directly focused on credibility contests, a
similar and relevant perspective is Abend's programmatic outline of a sociology of epistemol-
ogies, which “investigates the epistemological bases of people’s ideas, beliefs, and under-
standings, and societies’ norms, practices, and institutions (ordinary people and institutions, of
which scientists and science are a special part)” without focusing on truth claims per se, but on
the account people make to vindicate their truth claims (2018, p. 90).2
Moreover, like Gieryn and others, I suggest that we should give special attention to the
discourse produced by powerful actors who have the instruments to produce a complex discourse,
the capacity of being heard, and the symbolic power of transforming their words into realities,
such as judges, politicians, high civil servants, journalists, and intellectuals, i.e. “those who deal
professionally in making things explicit and producing discourses” (Bourdieu 2005, p. 37).
Researchers and experts provide sophisticated concepts, methods, and examples to build “theories
of science” (Brandmayr 2018). They do so not only by intervening in the public sphere by
publishing books, speaking at TV shows, writing online, or giving talks at public events, but also
by deploying their expertise in a wide range of organizational settings, including state commis-
sions, advisory boards, statistical agencies, firms, and transnational networks (Eyal & Buchholz
2010). When they narrate the vicissitudes of scientific truth, intellectuals do and achieve
something: as Baert (2012) argues, intellectual interventions, including in matters epistemolog-
ical, should not be conceived as representational, but as performative. By positioning themselves
and others, intellectuals can transform established epistemological oppositions and alter appar-
ently immutable cleavages. Trough intellectual interventions, public epistemologies are dissem-
inated and they are incorporated into public discourse.
Science and Italian Politics
In the last decade, science has become a deeply political issue in Italy. The concept was so
politically connoted that the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD) urged to “Vote for science”
by “choos[ing] the PD” in one of its advertisements for the 2018 general election (see Fig. 1).
This is probably neither new nor unique to Italy. Political propaganda often presents
electoral choices as highly consequential decisions in which voters have the power to protect
or to endanger some important value, whether this is freedom, cultural identity, or economic
growth, and science might be just another one (the PD made similar posters urging voters to
choose other valuable things that the party stood for, including Europe, the environment, and
culture). And that certain parties prize science more than others is also consistent with a vast
literature on the politicisation of science. For example, in the USA, since the 1970s, conser-
vatives have become more distrustful of science, while liberals’ trust remained stable (Gauchat
2012). However, various elements suggest that science has become particularly politicised in
recent Italian politics, so that this country represents a strategic case to understand the
development, dissemination, and use of public epistemologies.
2 Public epistemologies should thus be distinguished from “epistemology” as a specific philosophical branch,
and this is one reason why the plural form (“epistemologies”) should be favoured.
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Consider the debates that took place in the two chambers of the Italian parliament in
September 2018 about the approval of a decree including a change in vaccination policy.
According to the decree, parents registering their children for school could self-certify that
their kids were vaccinated, as required by existing law, instead of providing official documents
produced by medical institutions. For the opposition, mainly formed by centre-right and
centre-left parties, this allowed parents who were hostile to vaccination to easily circumvent
the obligation by lying on the self-certification, thus putting at risk the lives of children who
cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons. Deputies opposing the decree called it an “attack on
science” and “a declaration of war against science”. The government was accused of having
chosen “superstition over science”, and of having written the decree under the advice “of
shamans, not of scientists”. Members of the opposition claimed to be defending “the Italy of
science, the Italy of modernity”. They said that the parliament should be united in “adopting
decisions dictated by science, by good sense, which is prior to politics”, and that “on science,
either you are for or against”, as “the scientific method is one and only one”. The names of
several “great Italian scientists”, such as Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei, were invoked
time after time. Members of the majority, formed by anti-establishment parties, reacted by
accusing the opposition of “scientocracy”, others of transforming science into “an electoral
instrument” or into an instrument to promote special interests instead of the welfare of all. A
senator of the majority expressed concerns with the dichotomy that the opposition was
drawing between science and politics, and claimed that it would be worrying if the latter
“had no right in questioning certain absolute truths” posed by the former. He suggested that the
diversity of policies that have been variably considered as scientific is proof that “science can
become not the exercise of doubt and research, but the simple continuation of politics by other
means”. In turn, the opposition argued that criticising the decree “did not mean that science is
infallible, but simply that the fallibility of science can be ascertained only by science itself”.
They added that “considering science itself as a power that is separate from the interest of the
citizens” is “an obscurantist principle”. That these epistemological arguments did not apply
only to vaccination policies was made clear in the speech given by a member of the opposition,
a professor of economics. After having stated that the government was lingering with “the
constituency of those who oppose scientific truths”, i.e. of those according to which statements
are true “not because they are scientifically demonstrated, but because many people say that
they are true”, he added that “this is true for vaccines but perhaps even more for economics,
where in the last years prominent members of the government have championed economic
Fig. 1 Pro-science political bus advertising in Viterbo, February 2018 (source: Biancherini 2018)
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theories that not only have no scientific validity, but no empirical evidence either”. Conversely,
a senator of the majority, also a professor of economics, argued that one should not idolise the
truths of science, offering as proof his belonging to “a scientific community that has defended
austerity policies in the past and that has now changed its mind”, after having negatively
affected the lives of many people.3
In sum, the Italian parliament was deeply divided in September 2018 about how to define
science and its role in society. These debates epitomise two broad public epistemologies that
exist in contemporary Italian politics. I call the first the science aversion narrative, and the
second the science perversion narrative. What both narratives have in common is that they
consider the place and role of science as something crucial to understand contemporary
society.4
According to the first, Italy is a country characterised by a deep and irrational aversion to
scientific and expert knowledge. Science aversion is at times framed as a betrayal and at other
times as simple indifference, but the key theme is similar: the country regularly ends up being
administered by people with low intellectual capacities, who disdain experts and intellectuals,
believe in conspiracy theories and other pseudo-scientific ideas, and prize football, motors, and
sex parties over knowledge and culture. The effects of this form of anti-intellectualism are
catastrophic: measures are not taken to protect people from risks and uncertainties, to increase
the efficiency of state services, or to discover new solutions to pressing social problems.
Instead, politicians pass legislation that is based on emotions rather than reason, putting
peoples’ lives at risk and creating deep injustices.
Science aversion narrators use a list of tropes drawing from well-known cases: the
widespread belief around mid-2000s in the chemtrail conspiracy theory, leading to several
parliamentary interpellations (Bianchi 2017a); the controversy around the Stamina therapy, a
treatment without scientific validation aimed at neurogenerative diseases which underwent
costly clinical testing in 2013 following protest by patient groups (Cattaneo & Corbellini
2014); the conviction (later overturned) of six earthquake scientists in 2012 for having
downplayed the risk of an earthquake in L’Aquila, often framed as a sentence sending them
to jail for not having predicted the deadly earthquake that hit the city in April 2009 (Benacchio
2012); low spending and frequent budget cuts for universities and research organisations,
illustrated by common headlines such as “Italy at the tail-end [fanalino di coda] in research
and development spending” (Marcelli 2014) or “Italian election leaves science out in the cold”
(Abbott 2018).
People embracing this narrative have made the practice of “debunking” or “blasting”
conspiracy theories and hoaxes (bufale) in social media websites something enjoyable and
fashionable. They have introduced a whole series of epithets to ridicule ignorant people,
notably the sympathisers of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S), such as
“webete” (union of web and ebete, a stupid person) or “la ggente” (a twisted version of “the
people”). This narrative has also been enriched by concepts having a technical and scientific
flavour, such as that of “functional illiteracy” (analfabetismo funzionale) or “return illiteracy”
(analfabetismo di ritorno), generally presented as the condition of a person who can read but
3 See Camera dei Deputati 2018a: 59, 109, 119, 130, 132, Camera dei Deputati 2018b: 53, 83, 238, 246, 251,
282, Senato della Repubblica 2018: 39, 45.
4 Although not exactly mapping onto my categories, Bucchi’s (2010) analysis of the antagonism between a pro-
science faction and anti-science faction in contemporary Italy already pointed to the ubiquity of public debates
about science and underlined the tendency of both sides to reify both science and society as discrete and
autonomous entities.
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cannot interpret new information. Accordingly, reports attributed to the UNESCO and the
OECD are frequently cited in support of the claim that over 30% of the Italian population is
illiterate in this sense. People raising awareness of the omnipresence of functional illiterates
often assume that their cognitive deficiency would lead them to embrace false beliefs on a
wide range of different topics. In every policy domain, be it the environment, migrations, or
homosexual rights, there would then be an “illiterate” position based on bogus pseudo-
scientific theories. In this perspective, many believe that the chemtrail conspiracy theory is
to policies concerning air pollution what the opposition to Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs) is to agricultural policy. Between 2010 and 2020, the science aversion narrative has
been particularly common in mainstream media outlets such as the Corriere della Sera,
La Stampa, and L’Espresso. Further, it has been politically championed by the PD and by
other liberal, reformist, pro-European parties, such as +Europa, Scelta Civica, and sections of
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. In recent years, these parties have gathered votes from the
most highly educated and wealthier strata of Italian society (De Sio 2018, Maraffi 2018).
According to the opposite narrative, the science perversion narrative, the problem is not the
fact that science is ignored or distrusted, but the fact that scientific knowledge has been used in
Italy and elsewhere to support special interests and has replaced the will of the people in
determining what decisions are taken. At least since the 1990s, science has become an excuse
to pass elitist legislation that benefits the few against the many. Arguments offered to support
this claim are diverse, but often emphasise that Italy has been ruled by several so-called
“technical governments”, notably from 1995 to 1996, when Lamberto Dini led a team of
economists and jurists after the fall of the first Berlusconi cabinet, and, from 2011 to 2013,
when economist Mario Monti led a cabinet composed by many independent experts. If the
science aversion narrative labels its opponents as populist, the science perversion narrative
labels its opponents as technocrats. This comes with the accusation of exploiting the allegedly
neutral authority of expertise to pursue self-interested political choices, often closely associated
with industrial, financial, and military powers. Against the fetishism of facts, this narrative
proclaims that “where there’s a will there’s a way” (“volere è potere”). Against the bureaucratic
routinisation of science and its transformation in a hierarchical organisation, defenders of the
science perversion narrative celebrate the self-educated citizen, the passionate activist, and the
maverick genius. It resonates in sarcastic remarks addressed to academics, professionals, and
higher civil servants to ridicule the emptiness behind official titles and qualifications. An
example is Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega, ironically addressing the former President of the
Italian Constitutional Court as “Professor, Doctor, President, Emeritus”, and contrasting “the
big professors” who pretend to criticise and explain everything with his government, formed
by “humble, unexperienced, poor little boys who travel in the back seats”, but who can do
more in a few months than they did in forty years (Stella 2018). This public epistemology is
particularly common among the Five Star Movement (M5S), the Lega (especially since the
national populist turn imprinted by Salvini in 2013), and to some extent also in far-left parties
such as Liberi e Uguali and Potere al Popolo. Media outlets supporting this view include
Beppe Grillo’s blog (representing the radical side), il Fatto Quotidiano (representing the
moderate side), and La Verità.
During the 2010s, two intellectuals have been particularly vocal in championing these two
public epistemologies in political debates. Roberto Burioni, an immunologist, has been
engaged in vaccines controversies and has been a staunch defender of compulsory vaccination.
Alberto Bagnai, an economist, has become the leading voice of Italian Eurosceptics and has
urged a withdrawal of Italy from the eurozone. The debates to which they have taken part have
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different temporalities and trajectories, and have engaged different disciplines, intellectuals and
publics, but in both cases public epistemologies have been advanced and contested. I focus on
the period after 2010, in a structural setting dominated by online platforms emphasising user-
generated content.5
Roberto Burioni: Defending Science against Populist Aversion
A professor of microbiology and virology at the San Raffaele University in Milan born in
1962, Burioni has a very good publication and citation record, with over a hundred publica-
tions, an h-index of 26 and over two thousand citations as of 2019, according to the Scopus
database. He became actively engaged in debates about vaccine safety and mandatory
vaccination at the end of 2015, when a friend invited him to the Facebook “mom group”
she had created, and in which concerns about vaccines where raging wildly. Burioni accepted
his friend’s invitation to write a few explanatory posts, but was shocked to discover that the
opposite was happening: “it was the mothers who were explaining vaccines to me!” People
“whose sole degree was the supermarket loyalty card”, people “whose sole passed tests were
the blood ones”, were telling him that vaccines, “perhaps mankind’s greatest conquest, were
not only ineffective, but also extremely dangerous” (Burioni 2017, Ch. 2).
He quickly became well known to the general public, started participating in talk shows and
radio programmes, addressed concerns over risks associated with vaccines in his Facebook
page, and published a book titled Il vaccino non è un’opinione: le vaccinazioni spiegate a chi
proprio non le vuole capire [“The vaccine is not a matter of opinion: vaccination explained to
those who really don’t want to understand it”]. The book featured entertaining catchphrases
such as “there is nothing to discuss about childhood vaccination, only to administer”, and ended
with a list of “opinion-free facts” (“I fatti senza l’opinione”), including “vaccines are safe” and
“vaccines are not a conspiracy organised by multinational corporations” (Burioni 2016a).
The book was not isolated in criticising anti-vaccines beliefs (see e.g. Mantovani 2016).
Anti-vaccines or vaccine hesitancy movements, generally designated by the “No Vax” label,
have been active for several years in Italy, and the country has been labelled as the “anti-
vaccination capital of Europe” (The Week 2018). By and large, their concerns have been
especially well represented by the M5S. Beppe Grillo’s blog has frequently hosted comments
on the risk associated with vaccines and on the vested interests of politicians and pharmaceu-
tical companies in making them compulsory. Elected representatives of the M5S have
proposed various legal measures to limit their use (Matteucci 2017). Possibly as a result of
these efforts, vaccination coverage declined and went below the herd immunity threshold for
5 Many scholars have recently emphasised the importance of “social” or “Web 2.0” websites for understanding
how intellectuals operate and ideas spread in contemporary societies (e.g. Dahlgren 2012; Drezner 2017; Bacevic
2018, Carrigan 2019). My study bears witness to this: one of the two intellectuals I will consider has tweeted
183,000 times from October 2012 to February 2019, averaging a staggering 80 tweets a day. Intellectuals do
spend a lot of their time online today. Accordingly, I do not see any major objections against analysing debates on
Twitter, describing the content of Facebook pages, or analysing the comment section of a weblog. However,
studying these things poses specific challenges: online users can very easily edit and delete the content of their
publications (whether it is a blog post, a comment, or a whole webpage), without any notice to the external
observer, online content can be counterfeited easily, and users and whole websites can be created to imitate one’s
intellectual opponents in a distorted way, to bring them into disrepute. Extreme caution should therefore be
exercised when studying online debates.
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certain diseases. Low rates of vaccination became a major concern for the centre-left govern-
ment in 2016, leading to a 2017 law increasing free compulsory vaccinations from four to 12
(a number reduced to ten in a subsequent amendment), and making them mandatory for school
attendance. The decree was opposed by the Lega and the M5S and originated a new wave of
protest (Casula & Toth 2018).
Burioni’s real step into celebrity occurred when he wrote a Facebook post to debunk the
idea that immigrants from African countries increase the likelihood of meningitis epidemics.
Concerns of this sort were seemingly common following an anomalous increase in meningitis
that had been reported in Tuscany in 2015 and 2016, at a time when migrant arrivals in Italy
via the Mediterranean reached a historical high. In the post, published on 31 December 2016,
Burioni argued that “instead of being angry with people who are guilty of nothing, let’s
remember that we have an efficacious vaccine at our disposal against this meningococcus.” In
this post, Burioni stated that immigrants from Africa have nothing to do with the epidemic,
defined claims to the contrary as “senseless lies”, and classify those who disseminate them as
“ignorant dunces”. The post was commented and shared by thousands of users, before Burioni
deleted all comments, adding the following statement:
ALL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN DELETED. I would like to make clear that this page
is not a place where people who do not know anything can have a “civil debate” and
discuss on an equal footing with me. It is a page where I, who have been studying these
topics for thirty-five years, try to explain in an accessible way how things are. I do this
for free, whereas normally my time tends to be very generously paid. Making concepts
accessible requires simplification but everything I write is correct and, since I always
add the relevant sources, everyone can control by himself the truthfulness of what I
report. But he cannot start arguing with me. I hope to have clarified the issue: here the
right to speak is given only to those who have studied, and not to the common citizen.
Science is not democratic (Burioni 2016b).
“Science is not democratic” became a buzzword on social media and Burioni’s defining
catchphrase. It became a rallying cry for the liberal camp, a conversation stopper that could
be used against “functional illiterates”. It became a contemporary “E pur si muove!” and
Burioni a contemporary Galileo facing a mob of hysterical ignoramuses. In his books, online
publications, and media appearances, Burioni reiterated this epistemological claim. He also
offered a sketchy narrative explaining the aversion toward science in contemporary societies,
mainly connected to the fact that the new means of communication and information, and
especially social websites, have dumbed down the discussion over scientific and technical
issues and put experts and laypeople on the same level. For example, Burioni claimed that:
Unfortunately, Internet is a place where facts and opinions are mixed up and confused
with each other, where all voices – regardless of their authority – are on the same level,
where there is no filter, where in a discussion on fire prevention you will find the
firefighter and the pyromaniac undistinguished together, where in debating whether
vaccines cause autism you will find a researcher who has been studying the problem
with sacrifice for a lifetime and a mature playmate who claims to be a graduate of
Google university and to have discovered the origin of his son’s autism thanks to her
‘mother’s instinct’ (Burioni 2016a, Ch. 1).
For Burioni, this was not the case in the past, when people would consult an encyclopaedia
written by a specialist to inquire about a technical subject. He repeatedly argued that there is
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only one exception to the faulty norm according to which “anyone can speak about anything”,
and that is sport commentary: indeed, it never occurred to him “to listen to a football
announcer who ignored the offside rule”, which leads him to conclude bitterly that “today,
sport is much more respected than science” (Medicalfacts 2018).
In his second book, titled La congiura dei somari: Perché la scienza non può essere
democratica [“A conspiracy of dunces: Why science cannot be democratic”], Burioni purports
to outline a phenomenology of the dunce, consisting in sentences such as “dunces can be
treated with massive doses of books”, and describes a series of science hoaxes, not limited to
anti-vaccines theories. He admits that scientist can lie or go crazy, but warns that one “must
have confidence in the scientific community as a whole”, because within the scientific
community “a dishonest person is immediately marginalised by the facts”. He softens his
elitism, claiming that although science is not democratic, “knowledge is the most democratic
thing in the universe” since there are no shortcuts to acquire it, and the richest person in world,
like the poorest, must eventually “open a book and work hard on it” (Burioni 2017, Ch. 16).
One could argue that it is Burioni’s ill-tempered style that made him popular, reaching over
400 k followers on Facebook and over 110 k on Twitter as of December 2019, a significant
achievement in the context of Italy’s social media field, especially considering that before
joining the mom group in 2015, he only had around 150 contacts on Facebook (Burioni 2017,
Ch. 2). Within the national context, Burioni has become a celebrity scientist (Fahy &
Lewenstein 2014) who capitalises on typical attributes associated with the scientific persona,
notably exploiting unanticipated contrasts that excite the enthusiasm of the public. Burioni’s
appeal seems to be built on the contrast between his professional standing, which would define
him as an “egghead”, and the brutal way in which he nonchalantly taunts his opponents, which
would identify him more as a thug rather than an internationally renowned expert.6
Burioni has also become very popular among centrist politicians. A few months before the
March 2018 elections, Matteo Renzi, then secretary of the PD, offered Burioni a seat in
parliament claiming that “it made sense to involve certain personalities who symbolise our
struggles”. While he declined the offer, stating that his priority was doing research (la
Repubblica 2018a), Burioni endorsed Renzi, stating that he was one of the rare politicians
to have “sided courageously in defence of science and against witchcraft” (nextQuotidiano
2017). During the 2018 national elections, debates on compulsory vaccination have been
frequent, although the issue did not feature in most electoral programmes. By and large,
candidates of the Lega and the M5S claimed that while they were “in favour of vaccines”
(sometimes adducing that they had vaccinated their children as evidence), they were opposed
to the extension of mandatory vaccination introduced by the 2017 law, on the basis that ten
mandatory vaccines are too many (Bozza 2018). The “government deal” struck by the M5S
and the Lega stated that “although the goal of safeguarding individual and collective health by
ensuring the necessary vaccination coverage is important, it is also urgent to address the issue
of the right balance between the right to education and the right to health, protecting kids who
could risk social exclusion” (by being excluded from school for not being vaccinated) (il Post
2018a). The majority put forward an amendment letting parents self-certify that their children
are vaccinated in order for them to be admitted to school.
6 This stance resonates with a general trend that has made the educated public and scientists themselves speak of
science in a cool and down to earth fashion: think of Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that “Einstein was a badass,”
Matt Damon’s astronaut in “The Martian” vowing to “science the shit” out of problems, or the popular website
tellingly called “I fucking love science”. See Semley (2017) for more examples and a brief critique of this trend.
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In the meantime, Burioni published another book, titled Balle mortali. Meglio vivere con la
scienza che morire coi ciarlatani [“Deadly bullshit: better to live with science than die with
charlatans”] (Burioni 2018). In November 2018, he created his own platform, a website called
Medical Facts, with the aim of providing reliable information and debunking false beliefs in
the medical field. In January 2019, he also launched a “Cross-cutting Deal for Science” with
another immunologist, Guido Silvestri, asking politicians and prominent opinion leaders to
subscribe to it. The deal prescribes, among other things, that “all Italian political formations
support Science as a universal value devoid of any political colour which enables the progress
of humanity”, and that “no Italian political formation backs or tolerates in any way pseudo-
science and pseudo medicine in any form” (Medicalfacts 2019).
Burioni has been subjected to various forms of critique from different fronts. Activists of
the No Vax movements have made physical threats against him, and an online petition signed
by more than 100,000 users compared him to Nazi physician Josef Mengele (Change.org
2017). Several commentators criticised what they depicted as an outdated, elitist, conception of
science (Il Post 2018b), while others depicted him as a hired gun for “Big Pharma”, often
suggesting that he profited from patenting pharmaceutical innovations related to vaccines
(Cinquegrani 2017).
Within the PD, Burioni has become a totem for most of the leadership and a polluted
symbol for the radical fringes of newcomers. He represents a positive or negative symbol of
how elites in general should relate with the rest of the population, and especially how political
elites should relate with common citizens. In November 2018, at the PD national assembly in
Rome, Dario Corallo, a young candidate to be party secretary, stated that “we have decided to
tell the story of the 1% and we have humiliated the 99%, like any Burioni would do, by
entertaining himself with bullying those who try to express a doubt in simple terms”. This
provoked a reaction from the party leadership: under the pressure of activists and journalists
asking them to take side between Corallo and Burioni, most rallied around the latter (la
Repubblica 2018b).
Alberto Bagnai: Defending Science Against Elitist Perversion
Born in 1962, Bagnai obtained a doctoral degree at the University of Rome “La Sapienza” in
1994 and has been associate professor of economic policy at the University of Chieti since 2005.
Since the 2011, he has been an outspoken critic of EU economic policies and the leader anti-euro
economist in the country. That Bagnai’s active engagement started in 2011 is no coincidence.
Negative sentiments toward the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone have become wide-
spread in Italy since the depths of the European debt crisis. Italy is among the countries in which
the attitude toward the EU has most deteriorated in the decade from 2008 and 2018 (Debomy
et al. 2018). Berlusconi’s 2011 resignation followed the rising “spread” (the difference between
Italy’s 10-year bond yields and its German counterpart, reflecting investors’ fear of investing on
Italian bonds) and intense negotiations with EU institutions and other countries. The European
Central Bank made its support (i.e. the purchase of Italian bonds) conditional on the immediate
adoption of measures of deficit reduction and labour market liberalisation. As such, the whole
process (including the subsequent nomination by then-president Giorgio Napolitano of economist
Monti as primeminister) has been perceived bymany as foreign interference on internal affairs, or
even as a “coup d’état” led by EU institutions, the IMF and powerful foreign governments,
notably Germany and France (Matthijs & Blyth 2011).
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Between 2011 and 2013, several authors published books claiming that the institutional
structure of the Eurozone was negatively affecting Italy’s economy.7 These books were
distributed by small and eccentric publishers, most of them of recent creation. Unable to reach
a wide public by traditional publishing methods, most anti-euro authors created websites and
weblogs in which they analysed the crisis as it was unfolding, targeting mostly young, male
and fairly educated cybernauts. In mainstream media, the idea of leaving the Eurozone was
associated with weird mavericks, for the most part devoid of any academic standing, which
were depicted by high-profile economists as “denialists” and “conspiracy theorists” (Bisin
2013), while the idea of withdrawing from the Eurozone was deemed a “folly” (Pilati 2010)
and “impossible” (Dadush 2011). Indeed, unfounded rumours according to which Italians had
been deceived by being granted an unfavourable conversion rate from the lira to the euro were
common on social networks and other media. Yet, on the other hand, journalists and “de-
bunkers” tended to see all critiques of the euro as the outcome of ignorance of basic economic
principles or simple credulity.
Bagnai entered this field as a relatively unknown professor of economics at a provincial
university and positioned himself between two extremes: on the one hand, prominent orthodox
economists associated with elite institutions such as Bocconi University (notably Alberto
Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi) who supported EU targets of low inflation, deficit reduction,
and liberalisation, and, on the other hand, amateurs with little or no academic standing who
clumsily urged to burn EU institutions to the ground. Initially addressing people on the left,
Bagnai argued that an anti-euro position required believing not in plots orchestrated by
extravagant secret societies, but just in old-school class conflict and geopolitics. Although
an entertaining and often sarcastic writer, Bagnai emphasised the importance of rigour and
accuracy in making the case against the euro, citing academic sources and using datasets from
trusted sources such as the IMF or national statistical agencies. Several of his blog posts are
longer than many academic articles in economic journals. Bagnai’s standing as a serious
thinker was also reinforced by a series of extra-academic assets: he is fluent in French, English
and German, makes abundant use of Greek and Latin phrases, and plays harpsichord in several
baroque ensembles.
In 2010 and 2011 wrote several articles in which he criticised the euro for heterodox
economics webzines, such as Sbilanciamoci, for a communist newspaper, il Manifesto, and for
liberal magazines such as Lavoce.info. In November 2011, when the editorial staff of Lavoce.
info refused to publish a paper in which he criticised Monti’s contractionary fiscal policies,
arguing that Italy was facing a crisis of private debt due to trade imbalances rather than a crisis
of public debt, Bagnai decided to create his own platform, a BlogSpot blog titledGoofynomics.
In 2012, his book Il tramonto dell’euro. Come e perché la fine della moneta unica salverebbe
democrazia e benessere in Europa [“The sunset of the euro: how and why the end of the single
currency would save democracy and welfare in Europe”] was published by a then-recently
created publisher, Imprimatur, which has since become a prolific actor in the dissemination of
contrarian and Eurosceptic ideas (Bagnai 2012b).
In 2013, Bagnai created Asimmetrie - Italian Association for the Study of Economic
Asymmetries, with the aim of promoting research activities related to economic asymmetries
such as those between the North and the South of the EU. The charter of the association states
that “particular attention will be given to the monitoring and refutation of moralistic and partial
attitudes in the divulgation of economic facts, and to the promotion of activities of
7 The most noteworthy publication was Bruno Amoroso’s Euro in bilico (2011).
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popularisation based on the analysis of data and on scientific rigour, with the specific aim of
creating a bridge between the frontier of scientific research and citizens’ spontaneous knowl-
edge” (Asimmetrie 2013). In 2014, his book L’Italia può farcela. Equità, flessibilità,
democrazia. Strategie per vivere nella globalizzazione [“Italy Can Do It. Fairness, flexibility,
democracy. Strategies to live in a globalised world”] was published by the much more
established publisher Il Saggiatore (Bagnai 2014d). Although Bagnai still has no outstanding
publication record, he has published in a few highly specialized outlets, such as Energy Policy,
and in prominent “heterodox” journals such as the Cambridge Journal of Economics. On
Twitter, Bagnai has around 100 k followers, the only active Italian economist with a higher
share being Tito Boeri, a professor at Bocconi University and former director of the national
social security agency. According to the influential IDEAS database, Bagnai ranks 19th among
economists on Twitter by number of followers (IDEAS 2019). From October 2012 to February
2019, Bagnai has tweeted over 183,000 times, averaging 80 tweets a day. As of December
2019, he has published almost 2000 posts on his blog, which have been visited almost fourty
million times.
At the beginning of his public activity, Bagnai was not siding for any party, because none
saw the euro as a real problem. He quickly became dissatisfied with the ambivalence of the
M5S, especially for its anti-statist attitude (Bagnai 2014c) and its proposal of organising a
referendum to leave the Eurozone (for Bagnai, only a secret and rapid withdrawal would
preserve Italy from capital flight) (Bagnai 2012a). He also progressively distanced himself
from Eurosceptic representatives of the left, such a Stefano Fassina, whom he accused of
backing what he considered to be the shallow reformism of the Greek Syriza, the Spanish
Podemos, and the French Left Front (Bagnai 2015). Bagnai exemplified his disenchantment
with the left by referring to the 13 November 2011 front page of the daily l’Unità, founded in
1924 by Antonio Gramsci, in which Berlusconi’s resignation (and, in Bagnai’s interpretation,
even Monti’s subsequent EU-led appointment) were represented as a “liberation” (2014b).
Eventually, Bagnai concluded that Salvini’s Lega Nord was the only party that truly sided with
the working class and that defended Italian sovereignty against foreign interference. In 2015,
still identifying as a “progressive Keynesian”, he started welcoming the possibility of being the
minister of the economy in a future government led by Salvini (Cerami 2015). Just before
announcing his candidacy with the Lega, he wrote that “there is nothing new: it’s all written in
[Jean-Claude] Michéa’s books, including the fact that there are historical phases in which, in
order to defend ‘left-wing ideals’, it is first necessary to destroy the left” (Bagnai 2018). On 23
January 2018, Salvini held a press conference at the Chamber of Deputies in which he said that
Bagnai’s The Sunset of the Euro “had opened up a whole new world” for him and had brought
the Lega “to embrace a certain type of economic and cultural battle”. On 4 March 2018,
Bagnai was elected to the Senate.
With regard to his public epistemology, Bagnai seems to manifest a certain ambivalence
between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism that is not present in Burioni’s case. On the
one hand, Bagnai has regularly emphasised the importance of scientific methods and of the
consensus within the community of professional economists, and has made abundant use of
certain markers of epistemic legitimacy. In blog posts, interviews, and his books, he has
frequently remarked that the views he was defending were not really his, but rather the
expression of a consensus of economists dating back at least fifty years. The main reasons
why the euro is not a good institutional arrangement are to be found in textbooks and works
written by authoritative thinkers who have been recognized as such by winning Nobel prizes,
publishing in first-class journals, and occupying positions of leadership in scientific
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associations. In an early blog post, anticipating that readers may have been sceptical of his
ideas and consider him as “the usual visionary blogger or conspiracy theorist”, he listed several
prominent economists, notably Paul Krugman, Martin Feldstein, Dominick Salvatore, and
Rudiger Dornbusch, who had predicted the problems of the Eurozone (Bagnai 2011). Even
when speaking at political rallies alongside Salvini, he frequently referred to such well-known
scholars, suggesting that the leader of the Lega had just listened to and read a good
popularization of the truths discovered by these eminent social scientists. In Florence, on 7
February 2018, Bagnai stated, speaking of Salvini, that “this ‘dangerous extremist’ is a person
who is saying a thing that every economist knows and that was said in 1971 by an important
left-wing economist, [Nicholas] Kaldor, who was even a Lord, namely that if we do a
monetary union before the political one, there will be such economic tensions that we will
compromise forever the political union. This is what is happening”. This stance was blended
with a periodic mockery of “Sunday epistemologists”, i.e. people without any professional
legitimacy casting doubt upon Bagnai’s convictions on the ground that economics’ weak
scientific status does not allow him to make predictions about what would happen were Italy to
leave or not the eurozone. He thus stated that “whoever says that ‘economics is not a science’
is doing propaganda for the neoliberal project” (Bagnai 2017b).
But Bagnai’s emphasis on the value of first-rate economic knowledge is dwarfed by his
growing concern that science can be and in fact is regularly perverted in various ways: it can
become an unquestioned ideology whose authority is exploited by powerful interest groups to
advance their goals against the common good. Bagnai often refers to the case of Mark
Hegsted, a nutrition scientist who is notorious for having been accused of minimizing the link
between sugar consumption and heart disease due to his funding connections with the sugar
industry. The fact that his incriminated paper had been published in one of the most prestigious
medical journals, the New England Journal of Medicine, was taken by Bagnai as proof that
“one can simply doll up a pre-packaged thesis and pass the mythical peer-review”, adding that
“a good 90% of the research on the euro is visibly of this type” (Bagnai 2017e). He later added
that “in 2017, the literature on the pros [of the euro] is puny and mostly in conflict of interest,
being almost entirely funded directly or indirectly by institutions whose survival is linked to
the euro” (Bagnai 2017f). The implication is that people should reassert democratic control of
certain domains of life that have been de-politicised and handled by experts. This idea emerges
clearly in a 2016 exchange that Bagnai had with several other economists on Twitter. These
were advocating the creation of “independent agencies for rating public policy proposals”, to
which Bagnai retorted that “unless you are a fascist, you should acknowledge that such
agencies exist. We use to call them Parliaments, in our old-fashioned democracies” (Bagnai
2016). He ridiculed the whole post-truth discourse and the measures taken in 2017 by the
Gentiloni government to fight fake news as being reminiscent of an Orwellian “Ministry of
Truth” (Bagnai 2017a). These claims were often combined with harsh denunciations of high-
profile economists such as Giavazzi and Alesina acting as “organic intellectuals of the
capitalist class”, and of economics correspondents working for mainstream media acting as
“hired guns”, “regime’s misinformators”, and “regime’s clowns”. Morally connoted terms
such as “treason” and “deception” are common in Bagnai’s characterisation of intellectuals
(and elites in general) and channel a sense of antagonism between the people and the elite.
Other perversions of expert knowledge Bagnai chastises include the supposed indepen-
dence of bureaucracies in general and of central banks in particular, an idea he designates as a
“fetish”, “an antidemocratic and ruinous dogma”, whose consequence is keeping governments
under the duress of markets whenever they try to redress the hardships of the country through
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fiscal policy. He often uses the now popular acronym TINA to ridicule the ideology according
to which there is no alternative other than staying in the Eurozone and adopt austerity policies
(Bagnai 2014e). Journalist and medias cannot be trusted, since they are complicit in the EU
technocratic project: in one occasion, he defined journalists as “lackeys of the capital,
henchmen of the fascism of public opinion, the cancer of democracy” (Bagnai 2017d). Instead,
trust should be accorded to courageous politicians and critical intellectuals, who establish a
charismatic connection with their followers using various channels (including blogs and
associations) and energise social movements to enhance public participation for more demo-
cratic decisions. Accordingly, his discourse often turns prophetic, hinting that he is the
custodian of a secret body of knowledge. This exalted attitude is particularly visible in his
blog and in social networks, where Bagnai frequently deploys a blunt and outspoken rhetoric,
banning and blocking readers who criticise him, and using colourful epithets to insult abstract
entities (such as the “piddino”, the typical PD voter) as well as concrete individuals.
The tension between Bagnai’s emphasis on the value of scientific consensus in economics and
his distrust for many sources of economic knowledge is settled through the concept of
“Thescience” [Lascienza]. Thescience is for Bagnai and his followers a mockery of true science:
non-democratic (as Burioni would say), dogmatic, siding with the powerful. By contrast, true
science is democratic and constantly open to doubt. Thus, Bagnai can argue that his blog
originated “in the desire to redeem science from her slutty cousin, Thescience” (Bagnai 2017g).
It is hard to tell whether Bagnai’s arguments actually were instrumental to the flourishing of
anti-euro positions within the Lega, or whether they should be explained by reference to more
profound symbolic associations (such as connecting the euro with globalisation, foreigners,
and big banks) and strategic calculations by Salvini and other leaders. A draft of the 2018
government deal between the Lega and the M5S contained a motion to “introduce specific
technical procedures of a juridical and economic nature that will allow member states to
withdraw from the monetary union, and thus to regain their monetary sovereignty”
(Huffington Post 2018).8 However, in the final document, signed in May 2018, this paragraph
was replaced with a general indication advising to “reconsider, along with the European
partners, the structure of European economic governance (monetary policy, Stability and
Growth Pact, Fiscal compact, ESM, Macroeconomic Balance [sic] Procedure, etc.) which
today is asymmetrical and based on the dominance of the market instead of a wider economic
and social dimension” (il Post 2018a). Since its appointment, the government has been more
interested in confronting the EU over its budget deficit than in setting up procedures to leave
the Eurozone. In September 2019, a new government was formed with the support of the M5S
and other centrist and left-wing parties, with Salvini’s Lega back in the opposition.
A Political Sociology of Public Epistemologies
Burioni and Bagnai have become representative figures of the two main
epistemological discourses present in contemporary Italian political debates: the science
aversion narrative and the science perversion narrative (Table 1 resumes the main features of
the two public epistemologies). Although Burioni and Bagnai exploited and reinterpreted ideas
8 Apart from Bagnai, this formulation was probably demanded by Paolo Savona, an anti-euro economist and
high civil servant whose nomination as minister of the economy was successfully opposed in May 2018 by
president Sergio Mattarella.
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already present in the public sphere before their rise to prominence, they also contributed to
shaping these narratives by creating associations, disseminating ideas, and coining catch-
phrases that have become rallying cries for groups struggling for power. Despite the fact that
their work focuses, respectively, on vaccines and monetary systems, their discursive products
now circulate and are used by their followers and imitators across many different areas of
debate. As a matter of fact, Bagnai has made several incursions into the debate on vaccines and
has expressed scepticism toward the extension of mandatory vaccination, while Burioni has
made various allusions indicating his disapproval of anti-euro economic theories.9
That Burioni and Bagnai enjoy similar levels of popularity and political power also
suggests that public attitudes toward science in Italy cannot be reduced to either irrational
hostility and distrust of expertise or uncritical reverence of scientific authority. Instead, these
two antithetical attitudes should be conceived as part of two public epistemologies that are
used by competing factions in the political struggle. Eyal is right to argue that “what needs to
be explained it not a one-sided ‘death of expertise,’ ‘mistrust of experts,’ or ‘assault of
science,’ but the two-headed pushmi-pullyu of unprecedented reliance on science and expertise
coupled with increased suspicion, scepticism, and dismissal of scientific findings, expert
opinion, or even of whole branches of investigation” (2019, p. 4). However, it is important
to recognise that these two objectively occurring processes are also complemented by a
discursive and ideological level, i.e. the level of public epistemologies, that is shaped by these
objective processes and shapes them back. Technocratic encroachment and populist anti-
intellectualism are first and foremost imagined threats that are discursively constructed by
different factions involved in political battles, with the help of intellectuals such as Burioni and
Bagnai.
But what exactly are these factions? One possibility is that the two Italian public episte-
mologies are connected to transformations occurred in recent years in the political landscape of
Italy and other Western countries. They could be described, to simplify to the extreme, as being
part of the ideology of populist and liberal (or, to be more faithful to Italian lexicon,
“reformist”) political forces. Many observers believe that a new opposition, orthogonal to
the classic left and right dimension, increasingly structures contemporary political debates
across the world. Although the particulars vary sensibly, the diagnosis is similar: we are
witnessing a rise of populist movements and parties, which appeal to a homogenous, authentic
people rooted in a specific national culture in opposition to unelected administrative bodies,
condescending intellectuals, powerful institutions, foreign powers, and elites of various sorts.10
The electoral achievements of parties such as the M5S and the Lega in recent years testify to
the importance of this trend in Italy. Opponents of populism are a heterogeneous bunch,
including social-democrats, “third way” liberals, Christian-democrats, centrists of many sorts,
9 The parliamentary speech quoted above about science being the “continuation of politics by other means” is
Bagnai’s. By and large, Bagnai has expressed his vicinity toward intellectuals and researchers who have been
critical of vaccination laws, claimed that the PD addressed the issue of vaccination in a “hysterical way”
(FirenzeToday 2018), and hinted that the whole debate on vaccines is a “giant weapon of mass distraction”
(Bagnai 2017c). Burioni’s regularly intervenes in heated online exchanges siding with pro-euro economists and
politicians, adding remarks such as “I am perfidiously enjoying it: for two years I have thought that idiots would
show interest only in immunology, instead I am pleased to see that even economists have their fair share”
(Burioni 2018).
10 This vast literature includes such differentiations as high versus low (Ostiguy 2017), national populism versus
neoliberalism (Eatwell & Goodwin 2018), illiberal democracy versus undemocratic liberalism (Mudde 2015),
somewheres versus anywheres (Goodhart 2017), globalists versus nationalists (Haidt 2016), and rationalists
versus intuitionists (Oliver & Wood 2018).
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but they tend to be united by a common attraction toward traditional and mainstream ways of
doing politics. They value pluralism, the rule of law, civil rights, free markets, international
integration, and they tend to view favourably the development of unelected expert bodies,
regulatory committees, and independent agencies that have gained a prominent role in shaping
public policies in the last decades (Jasanoff 1990, Radaelli 1999).
We could then consider the science perversion narrative as the epistemological facet of Italian
populism, and the science aversion narrative as the epistemological facet of Italian liberalism.
Burioni nicely illustrates the anti-populist inclination of the science aversion narrative when he
offers the analogy between talking about mandatory vaccination and commentating a football
match: everyone knows that there are rules in football and that these must be known to be able to
talk about it; whereas, when talking about compulsory vaccination, everyone thinks they have a
say in the discussion even without knowing the “rules”, i.e. immunological scientific evidence.
Thus Burioni, in classic anti-populist fashion, suggests that the gap between themass of laypeople
and highly specialised experts should be widened rather than narrowed: the popular will cannot
translate directly into policy but must be mediated by independent scientific institutions. Con-
versely, Bagnai epitomizes the populist bent of the science perversion narrative when he claims
that “a good 90%” of the research on the euro cannot be trusted because it is funded by pro-EU
organisations, or when he chastises the “fetish” of central bank independence. This is what many
scholars have identified as a key piece of the populist repertoire, and what Brubaker designates as
“antagonistic repoliticization”, i.e. “the claim to reassert democratic political control over domains
of life that are seen, plausibly enough, as having been depoliticized and de-democratized, that is,
removed from the realm of democratic decision-making” (2017, p. 364). Further research could
investigate whether the two narratives are generalisable to other cultural contexts, and whether the
link between public epistemologies and political commitments stands closer scrutiny.
Speaking of the science perversion narrative as one of the possible epistemologies of
populism might sound strange to many. There is a long-lived and heterogeneous body of
literature arguing that populism puts experience, what people see with their own eyes, over
knowledge, i.e. facts and theories about the world (Hofstadter 1963, Saurette & Gunster 2011;
Speed & Mannion 2017; Waisbord 2018). In this perspective, a populist public epistemology
is a contradiction in terms, as populism operates according to an “anti-epistemology” denying
any value to abstract reasoning. The Italian case of Bagnai suggests instead that populist
movements include intellectuals who develop sophisticated theories about the nature of truth,
the role of scientific institutions in society, and the methods that should be followed to acquire
knowledge of the natural and social worlds. Rather than denying any value to the concept of
truth, as suggested by authors claiming that we have entered an age of post-truth politics,
Table 1 Two public epistemologies in Contemporary Italy
Science aversion Science perversion
The purpose of science is Solving problems Challenging dogmas
The opposite of science is Idiocy, arrogance Ideology, conformity
Falsehood persists because New technologies are making us dumber Powerful groups prevent
truth from being told
Falsehood is spread by Arrogant and uneducated people Mainstream experts and journalists
Truth is revealed by Accredited scientists Informed activists
Trust requires The right credentials Charisma
Politics is The struggle between reason and emotion The struggle between the
people and the elites
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populist movements can advocate and produce what Ylä-Anttila calls “counterknowledge”,
hence professing a “belief in truth achievable by inquiry, not by mainstream experts but
alternative ones” (2018, p. 356). Furthermore, populist movements are in all likelihood
internally differentiated in various groups with distinctive “truth orientations”, i.e. attitudes
(rather than the coherent narratives analysed here) toward scientific knowledge and expertise
(Ylä-Anttila 2018, p. 379). Applying this insight to the Italian case, it might be argued that
Bagnai mainly represents and addresses the most highly educated sections of the people
identifying with and voting for the Lega. Overall, my analysis of public epistemologies in
Italy joins other recent works suggesting that scholars should pay more attention to the
complex and multifaceted cognitive and intellectual dimensions of populist, nationalist, and
right-wing movements (Merriman 2019, Panofsky and Donovan 2019).11
A similar critique could be levelled against my account by those who believe that
perceptions of and approaches to science cannot be reduced to either quasi-technocratic or
quasi-populist ones, on the grounds that this is a false dilemma. Indeed, the two Italian public
epistemologies are reminiscent of two of the three idealised conceptions (or “waves”) of the
relations between science and society identified by Collins and Evans (2017). According to the
first conception, which runs from the early twentieth century up until the 1960s, “science was
unquestionably the pre-eminent form of knowledge-making” and “its knowledge was absolute
and universalistic,” while the second conception, which emerged in the 1960s, “provided a
powerful argument against technocracy by showing how expert advice rested on a sea of social
assumptions” leading to “arguments in favour of the democratization of science, and of
expertise more generally.” Collins and Evans refer to the academic discipline of science
studies, but write that at least the first conception “informs many popular representations of
science” (2017, p. 17–18). Applying this scheme to the Italian case, it is easy to see how
Burioni’s science aversion narrative implicitly draws from Wave One theories, while Bagnai’s
science perversion narrative draws from Wave Two challenges to the objectivity of expert
advice. In a typical synthetic move, Collins and Evans then suggest that a new conceptuali-
sation of science-society relations is needed, and theorise a Wave Three that combines expert
authority and democratic accountability, while rejecting both “technological populism” and
technocracy. Here, too, there are no compelling signs that such higher synthesis obtains in
contemporary Italian politics. While it is possible that a third public epistemology, alternative to
the science aversion and perversion narratives, will be developed by prominent intellectuals, perhaps
closely associated with new radical left-wing movements, nothing quite like that exists at the
moment. One might argue that some intellectuals have criticised technocratic depoliticisation while
11 The claim that Burioni and Bagnai represent the epistemological version of the political opposition between
liberalism and populism might raise some eyebrows on the grounds that it neglects radical left-wing movements
and obfuscates the right-left distinction under the vague notion of populism. However, and as unfortunate as it
might be, radical left parties have enjoyed very little support in Italy during the decade between 2010 and 2020, a
fact all the more striking for a country that has been home of the strongest communist party of the West in the
post-war period (Broder 2020). Besides Bagnai, many media intellectuals, such as Marxist-Hegelian philoso-
phers Paolo Becchi and Diego Fusaro, progressively rejected the left-right opposition altogether during this
period, often aligning with the Lega and the M5S and having contacts with explicitly neo-fascist groups (Bianchi
2017b). Other intellectuals traditionally close to the left have similarly dismissed old divides by joining the
reformist camp, such as former communist philosopher Massimo Cacciari commending Monti’s efforts to
liberalise the market and imploring him to run for Prime Minister (Cacciari 2012). Of course, many Italian
intellectuals still identify with the radical left and regularly denounce both the crass bigotry of the populists and
the elitism of the reformists. However, they often advance epistemological arguments against science perversion
that are similar to those that Bagnai has been marshalling since 2011. For interesting perspectives from the left
see Tomatis (2015), Dalla Riva (2019), and Sandal (2019).
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also resisting populist capture, especially in connection with protests against major infrastructure
projects such as the Turin–Lyon high-speed railway (Pellizzoni 2011, Chiaramonte 2019), but none
has acquired the influence and power that Burioni and Bagnai enjoy.
Furthermore, Burioni and Bagnai have tried in their own way and to different degrees to
synthetize different perspectives, integrate critiques and respond to counterarguments. Burioni
admitted that individual scientists can be wrong, while Bagnai argued that a Nobel prize
signals that an economist deserves to be heard. Each of the two might claim that his views are
complex and well-rounded, while his opponent’s views are just the expression of one-sided
fanaticism. In reality, what can be observed is just a conflict between two opposite positions,
without anything really suggesting that one side is overcoming the tension between expert
authority and democratic participation. As much as this can be considered a false dilemma, it is
what recent Italian politics has produced in terms of public epistemologies.
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